> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.fixedlend.com/FixedLend/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.fixedlend.com/FixedLend/main/known-issues.md).

# Known Issues

Users must understand and acknowledge the following risks and protocol mechanics before participating.

### **Collateral De-Peg Risk**

Lenders assume the full risk of the collateral asset de-pegging from its expected value.

* **Mechanism:** In a loan, a borrower provides collateral (e.g., WSTETH) to borrow another asset (e.g., ETH). If the collateral asset loses significant value (a "de-peg" event), the borrower may choose to default on the loan. In this scenario, the borrower keeps the more valuable borrowed asset (ETH), and the lender is left with the de-valued collateral (WSTETH).
* **Mitigation:** Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios are set to provide a buffer against minor price fluctuations. However, LTVs may not be sufficient to protect lenders from capital loss in the event of a severe or sudden de-peg.

### Unified Asset Valuation Model

The protocol operates on a unified valuation model within each specific asset market.

* **Principle:** For any given market (e.g., the USD stablecoin market), the protocol treats all listed assets as being equal in value (1:1). For example, within the USD market, 1 USDC is programmatically treated as equivalent to 1 USDT and 1 DAI.
* **Implication:** This is a core design assumption. Users should be aware that the protocol does not use external price oracles to account for minor price differences between assets in the same market. (Note: This is a non-issue for single-asset markets like ETH).

### Decimal Normalization and Dust Amounts

To facilitate interoperability between assets, the protocol's internal accounting normalizes all asset values to 18 decimals. This can lead to the creation of "dust" balances.

* **Example:** USDC uses 6 decimals, while the protocol treats it as having 18. If a user borrows a tiny fraction of a dollar, such as 100 units at 18 decimals (i.e., 100 \* 10^-18USD), this amount is too small to exist as a transferable unit of USDC on-chain (1 \* 10^-6 USD).
* **Recommendation:** While the protocol does not forbid loans that result in dust, we strongly advise against them as the resulting balances may not be withdrawable.

***

#### **Advanced Considerations for Market Makers**

Market makers should be aware of the following mechanics specific to creating offers.

### Offer Matching and High-Volume Micro-Loans

A single, large market maker offer can be filled by an unlimited number of smaller taker loans.

* **Scenario:** An offer to borrow up to 0.1 ETH can be matched by thousands of micro-loans, each of negligible value. This can create a significant administrative burden.
* **Dust Repayment Facility:** To streamline repayments, market makers can pre-deposit funds (e.g., ETH) into the platform. This allows lenders with dust-sized positions to be repaid directly from this reserve on liquidation events.

### **Taker-Determined Loan Durations**

While market makers set a duration range, the final loan duration is selected by the market taker.

* **Mechanism:** A market maker specifies a minimum and maximum duration for their offer (e.g., 5 days to 1 month). A market taker can then initiate a loan for any duration that falls within this range and has at least a 1-day term (e.g., 10 days, 20 days, or 29 days).
* **Key Consideration:** Market makers must acknowledge that the final loan term will be at least their specified minimum but could extend up to their maximum. Setting a high maximum duration may result in a longer-than-expected capital lock-up. The user interface provides warnings when setting long durations to highlight this risk.
